Abstract
Introduction
"In the context of contemporary projects of security and state violence, lesbian and gay rights discourse occupies a recuperative role for institutions and practices long contested by anti-racist, anti-colonial, feminist and queer intellectual traditions and social movements." 2 for gay and lesbian refugees and calling attention to the challenges that had been faced by claimants applying for sexuality-based asylum in the UK. Alongside this decision, and for years prior to it, scholars and practitioners had been documenting and theorising some of the particular challenges facing gay and lesbian asylum seekers in Europe,
Commonwealth countries and elsewhere. 3 There have also been important judgments on sexual-orientation-based asylum handed down on the European level in the intervening years, 6 Discussing sexual rights among international and migration lawyers and activists, by virtue of the material necessity of country reports and context-based evidence from claimants' countries of origin, has shuttled constantly between sexual rights and refugee rights, and in the past few years, this tension has been teased out before a wide and attentive public. The liberal or leftist approach has been mainly to view recent expansion of the scope of protection of gay and lesbian refugees as a step in the right direction, towards protection of basic human rights and, in the case of HT and HJ, a more appropriate way to conceive of persecution on the basis of sexuality than the so-called discretion test had been. However, whilst this judgment has been regarded as mainly a positive advancement for protecting individuals fleeing sexuality-based persecution, aspects of such asylum claims reveal ways in which such advancements serve to reinforce and discipline not only sex-sexuality-gender norms, but also cultural stereotypes, as well as our core assumptions about the goals and limitations of the refugee law system. Such advancements are shifts in the legal regulation of refugee status that, just below the surface, re-instantiate professional and disciplinary expectations not to address certain issues that are critical to understanding sexuality both in the context of defining persecution as well as in articulating the global justice aims of the international refugee law system. The HT and HJ moment, then, marks an appropriate time to ask what it would mean to 'queer' refugee law. 4 
Joined Cases C-199/12, C-200/12 and C-201/12, (X, Y and Z) v. Minister voor Immigratie en Asiel, 7
November 2013, Court of Justice of the European Union (ruling that the existence of criminal laws "which specifically target homosexuals supports the finding that those persons must be regarded as forming a particular social group", that criminal laws per se do no constitute persecution, and that applicants cannot be expected to be discreet about their sexuality in their respective countries of origin). In her opinion, AG Sharpston suggests that the Court should rule that refugee applications made on the basis of persecution related to sexual orientation are subject to credibility assessments, but that these assessments must comply with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and that, furthermore, practices such as "medical examinations, pseudo-medical examinations, intrusive questioning" and "accepting explicit evidence showing an applicant performing sexual acts are incompatible with Articles 3 and 7 of the Charter". 6 M.E. v. Sweden, 26 June 2014, ECHR. In this judgment, the Court accepted that the Libyan asylum applicant was in a relationship with N (a transexual woman), but did not accept that he would face a risk of persecution if returned to Libya to make his family reunification application (required by Swedish law) because the level of violence was not seen as credible and he had presented N as a woman to his family over skype, which ostensibly indicated that he was choosing to live discreetly. Setting the credibility issue aside, this judgment relies to a large extent on the notion that LGBTIQ people should be required to be discreet in certain situations, without questioning whether the discretion is for fear of persecution. Cf. HT and HJ case, supra note 2.
with Hathaway and Pobjoy, that cases such as HT and HJ, while they seem to protect asylum applicants more completely, force applicants to couch their claims in conventional culturallyspecific western terminology (e.g., through use of the terms 'homosexual' and 'gay' to describe sexuality) and do not challenge normative conceptions of sexuality. While Halberstam deploys the idea of a queer methodology as it relates to the study of human behaviour, I apply it in considering refugee law, both in theory and in practice. As theoreticians, we are disciplined to regard refugee law as the best solution for those fleeing persecution. Given the current geopolitical order, it represents the best of many evils, or,
given the near-impossibility of the devolution of borders and states, the possible among impossibilities. As practitioners we realise that, whatever critiques of the refugee law system we may advance outside of court, when before a tribunal and navigating the strait-laced gauntlet of legal techniques necessary to achieve a positive refugee status determination for a client, it is at best impractical to mention the critical perspective one might otherwise have Note: This is a pre-publication version of an article that appears in 22(1) International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, January 2015. Not for distribution. different processes, but share a common set of discourses, challenges and dangers. 15 It is important to reflect upon the two strands of work with a common frame of reference in order to best understand the contingencies that undergird them both.
Asylum lawyers in immigration tribunals are primarily concerned with securing refugee status for individual applicants in receiving countries, rather than with attempting to change the conditions in applicants' countries of origin, although the persecution is often immediately related to these conditions. The most direct reason for this is that refugee cases, like other cases, are scripted for answering certain legal questions to the exclusion of other potentially related questions. The presumption is that, within the set of human rights-based remedies available to refugees, determining the official refugee status of an applicant is largely independent of related social change activism that seeks to alter the conditions that make protection necessary in the first place-or at least such discussions are not thought to be appropriate in the courtroom.
The concern of the refugee lawyers advocating for increased protections for LGBTIQ refugees is to prove that claimants are being persecuted on the basis of sexuality, as defined and understood by applicable case law or, alternatively, to change the way the case law is interpreted to the same effect. Meanwhile, queer theorists and those concerned with the limited sense in which sexuality is discussed in both these contexts remind us that sexuality, in many people's lived experience, is not limited to binary self-identification in terms of sex, gender and sexuality. Numerous advocates and academics are active in both international decriminalisation of same-sex sexual activity and LGBTIQ refugee claims advocacy, though perhaps in different capacities and fora.
There is a professional expectation that these two strands of advocacy be kept separate. A refugee status determination hearing or immigration tribunal is not a receptive venue for debating the limits of geo-politics as a conceptual framework for organising violence, as this lies outside of the framework categories familiar to the judges. The framework used in refugee claims is, as discussed, firmly rooted in the logic of politicallydefined borders, jurisdictions and corresponding cultural and social attitudes. However, the discourses related to decriminalisation and refugee protection share common terms, including 'culture', 'human rights', and 'safety', as well as various ideological renderings of Europe as 15 It is important to note here that the abbreviation LGBTIQ is perhaps not as deeply entrenched in the particular approach to and understanding of sexual politics that LGBT is. However, neither term is necessarily applicable to all contexts. They both suffer from some of the same shortcomings as the language of universality with regards to human rights, notably the difficulty in coordinating local meaning with such global vernacular. 
Comfort Zones and Death Zones
There is a dual aesthetic that shapes both the study and practice of refugee law which can be summarised as a self-reinforcing polarity of comfort and death. This polarity refers mainly to 16 An exception to this is the relatively recent case of Russia having implemented harsh laws against sexual minorities, which has increased the number of LGBTIQ refugees fleeing Russia to other parts of Europe. 17 This is not to say that the colonial legacy is necessarily a persuasive element in spurring law reform initiatives.
how we regard the ideological and material substance of refugee claims, but it also describes how we view ourselves in light of the total predicament of the refugee system, including the conditions that necessitate such a system. I will begin with a reflection on the concept of 'comfort'.
The type of comfort that I mean is two-fold. First, there is the comfort that many advocates and scholars have in the assumption that legal logics adequately describe social realities. For example, there is comfort with human rights discourse that arranges the world into geopolitical realms of safety and danger. In the case of the rights of LGBTIQ individuals this cartography is, at its most overt, expressed with the evolution narrative that extends from criminalisation of gay sex to recognition of same-sex marriage, entrenching a linear rights model within the familiar civilising discourse of social 'progress'. Beyond the problematic use of an evolutionary schema, what is presumed to be the furthest point of progression in the schema is recognition of same-sex marriage, which can also be critiqued as an unimaginative, violent institution, advocacy for which has relegated other issues affecting a broad range of queer people and people of colour to the political margins. 18 This advances a flat, impoverished picture of society-using the parameters of rights and rights-granting national jurisdictions, rather than a lived reality full of contingencies and power relations that shape not only experiences of sexuality, but experiences of location at the junctions of law, politics, gender, sexuality, race, class, etc. Comfort with this language of rights also allows what Nadine El-Enany has referred to as 'legal idolatry,' 19 or the belief that where rights exist, justice is bound to follow, rather than viewing a myriad of other exclusionary administrative measures that exist alongside rights as technologies for curtailing material or substantive benefits for disenfranchised people on the other end.
The other type of comfort that I mean is the comfort that accompanies adherence to disciplinary or professional discourses by practitioners and advocates. The advocate for
LGBTIQ refugees in this scenario, whether lawyer, activist or policy champion, attempts to widen the scope of protection for LGBTIQ refugees by identifying gaps in coverage, or advocating for one particular person to gain asylum, while generally maintaining the legitimacy of the refugee system. 20 While practitioners in the courtroom advocate for singular clients, some cases, such as HT and HJ, can result in significant shifts in jurisprudence. better, not asking these questions. This comfort allows us to focus on the 'positive'-the refugee system allows those privileged enough to cross a border, and often the sea, to ask for protection and get it. 22 It allows us as academics, activists and practitioners, to defer to the current system, as it unarguably saves lives while politically viable alternatives are curtailed by a deeply entrenched global infrastructure for policing movement. It is with the discomfort posed by these questions that I shift to discuss the concept of death.
If the promise of comfort is central to the refugee law system, then the spectre of death is the other atrium of the system's discordant heart. The title of this paper is borrowed from Balibar's idea of 'death zones'. 23 With this concept, Balibar reminds us that spaces defined by extreme violence exist within Europe, not only outside of it. This is to be seen as a corollary to the assumption that Europe is a zone of safety and that refugees abroad will flee persecution over there to enjoy a haven right here. In "Outlines of a Topography of Cruelty", Balibar inverts the typical narrative of Europe as the place synonymous with human rights and safety by pointing to the extreme violence that occurs within Europe against those rights discourse in prominent ways, though filtered through the propositions regarding torture and contextual assumptions regarding persecution as per the Geneva Convention rather than the transposition of international norms to national constitutions. 21 HT and HJ case, supra note 2. The decision rejected what had been commonly known as the 'discretion test' for lesbian and gay asylum applicants, with the effect that claimants are no longer expected to return to their countries of origin to live discreetly if they would only do so for fear of persecution were they to live as openly gay or lesbian. without European citizenship and, thus, without the full protection of a European state. 24 In describing these zones, he argues:
"In the end it would be my suggestion that the 'g[l]obalization' of various kinds of extreme violence has produced a tendential division of the 'globalized' world into life-zones and death zones. Between these zones (which indeed are intricate, frequently reproduced within the boundaries of single country or city), there exists a decisive and fragile superborder, which raises fears and concerns about the unity and division of mankindsomething like a global and local 'enmity line,' like the 'amity line' which existed in the beginning of the modern European seizure of the world. It is this superborder, this enmity line, that becomes at the same time an object of permanent show and a hot place for intervention. But also for nonintervention." 25 Here, Balibar describes "extreme violence" as geopolitically "without borders or beyond borders" rather than "violence of the border". This is important, as it suggests that locating the violence of refugee law at the border (and we are familiar with the trope of border violence that frames a great deal of refugee work in Europe-illustrative phrases like 'the guarded gate', 'the treacherous sea', 'Fortress Europe' easily come to mind) limits more thorough consideration of violence as it fails to recognise more pervasive and widespread violence within the borders and beyond the borderline. The superborder framework for identifying violence considers extreme violence to be something that is not shaped solely by the policing of the political boundaries of the state, but also inter-subjective and interinstitutional domains that can exist within the nation and even within cities and localities.
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Public discourse with regard to threateningly large refugee 'flows' into Europe and the parallel vernacular of 'saving' the refugees regularly deployed in media discourse relating to refugees does not mirror the lived reality of many refugees and asylum seekers. relates to the maintenance of a commitment to geographical organisation of spaces of violence and salvation. The refugee context also provides a window for viewing the appropriation of refugee stories in an effort to appropriate the violence that occurs 'over there' as a politics of renewed violence against all of those in countries imputed to be persecutory.
First Rupture: The Problem with Mapping
Both efforts to globally decriminalise same-sex sexual activity as well as refugee law advocacy attempt to know the subject and to locate the subject in a schema of relative violence or safety, comfort or death. This 'knowing' involves a process of mapping, both in terms of a corporeal and psychological mapping of the refugee subject as well as a global geopolitical mapping of culture and society.
Anti-queer Knowing
The structure of rights-based remedies, whether constitutional reform or refugee protection, force us as advocates to reckon with the "paradox of rights" as discussed by Wendy Brown, with which she refers to our frustration with rights-based approaches as we observe and criticise the systems of structural power in which rights are articulated and executed. 38 In describing one aspect of the "paradox of rights," in relation to contemplating remedies to gender violence, Brown argues:
"Rights function to articulate a need, a condition of lack or injury, that cannot be fully redressed or transformed by rights, yet within existing political discourse can be signified in no other way. Thus rights for the systematically subordinated tend to rewrite injuries, inequalities, and impediments to freedom that are consequent to social stratification as matters of individual violations and rarely articulate the conditions producing or fomenting that violation. Yet the absence of rights in these domains leaves fully intact these same conditions." through visual stimuli and attaching electrodes to the genitals). 43 More routinely, at least in the UK, asylum applicants feel pressure to prove their sexuality according to sex-act-based criteria, sometimes submitting videos and photographs into evidence to prove their identities through sex acts. 44 Others feel that they must render verbal accounts of their sexual encounters or participation in same-sex relationships. One cannot help but to imagine these various forms of bodily inspection as a part of the economy of morality and sexual politics that shapes other aspects of the allocation of human rights-it is one that assigns value to a certain type of subject, a certain form of story, particular forms of evidence, and a certain narrative of (the body's relation to) danger. Of course, this is not peculiar to the LGBTIQ refugee, though in the LGBTIQ narrative, the body and its sexual potentialities take on an undeniable centrality.
In reading the body for its sexual potentiality, its relationship to a legible narrative and to an imagined space, the body is positioned not only sexually but racially, culturally and politically. The act of reading and assessing the body, aside from reconstructing a colonial scene where resources and bodies are carefully balanced in an economy of labour, fear and desire, also constructs the world and power through the lens of empire. In other words, the gaze of knowing cast upon the body is a colonial gaze, invested in policing the body as much as policing resources and geopolitical integrity. 
Failures of Geopolitical Logics
Global efforts to repeal various countries' national laws criminalising same-sex sexual activity are often invested in a related mapping project around human rights-one that slices the world into domains of protection and violence. 'Decriminalisation' as a global coordination of political and legal reform efforts is also, like any other such project, a discursive one. Focus on criminal laws, then, as a central mode of social change starts down a path with a particular ideological trajectory and scope. This can be posited as a naming-and-shaming project, or as a legal tool for mapping the current state of the law in each country. 46 While maps emphasise a way of thinking about legal and political battles regarding repressive laws as fought along the borders of states, which can itself be problematic in the ways that Balibar suggests with the idea of the superborder, it is not only the graphic representation that creates the danger of retrenchment of organising violence around geopolitical borders. 47 One danger of thinking of violence as a function of state assemblage rather than in accordance with what Fanon refers to as 'zones of being' and 'zones of non-being' 48 is that it reproduces a public civilising discourse, one that uses states' laws as a proxy for the composite repression within the state. Of course, repressive laws have a violent effect, and one should not ignore these laws as instruments of social repression. Also, it is useful for refugee practitioners to understand what countries will, at least partly by virtue of their laws serve as willing recipient countries for refugees. However, one should be critical of using law as a proxy for the possibility of violence for a few reasons.
First, and very practically, focusing on the laws as a proxy for violence highlights the violence done by the state and risks trivialising other forms of violence. This is especially true in the context of the decriminalisation project. For example, violence against women in South Africa is legally prohibited in South Africa, but it is nonetheless commonplace. 49 As it happened, certain refugee cases in the UK had relied on a map published by ILGA in order to either affirm or negate the likelihood that persecution was taking place in particular countries based on whether the state had criminalised same-sex sexual activity or provided protections for LGBTIQ people. 50 Although it is currently being discussed, criminalisation of same-sex sexual activity has not often been interpreted to constitute per se persecution. The intent focus on political power, coloniality, and racism inherent in Fanon's framing of violence in "zones of being and nonbeing" gives us a different way to look at refugee law that goes in a different direction from the national-cultural framework that is typically used to assess country situations for refugees. 59 Verdirame rightly argues that 55 Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, supra note 48, p. 8. 56 Ibid. He notes here: "the black man is not a man". On the same page he continues, "The black is a black man; that is, as the result of a series of aberrations of affect, he is rooted at the core of a universe from which he must be extricated. The problem is important. I propose nothing short of the liberation of the man of color from himself. We shall go very slowly, for there are two camps; the white and the black." Fanon, in Black Skin, White Masks, looks at colonialism, and settler colonialism in particular, to trace the line between the two camps. This line may be what Balibar might describe an 'enmity line'. However, Fanon also applies the framework of being and non-being to other forms of slavery, epidermal schema of oppression, etc., as implicit in his term 'man of color.' 57 Ibid., p. 14. 58 Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, supra note 33, pp. 34-35. 59 See Ramon Grosfoguel, 'The Epistemic Decolonial Turn', 21:2-3 Cultural Studies (2007), p. 220. Grosfoguel describes coloniality in the following way: "'Colonial' does not refer only to 'classical colonialism' or 'internal colonialism', nor can it be reduced to the presence of a 'colonial administration'. Quijano distinguishes between colonialism and coloniality. I use the word 'colonialism' to refer to 'colonial situations' enforced by the presence of a colonial administration such as the period of classical colonialism, and, following Quijano (1991, 1993, 1998) , I use 'coloniality' to address 'colonial situations' in the present period in which colonial administrations have almost been eradicated from the capitalist world-system. By 'colonial situations' I mean the cultural, political, sexual, spiritual, epistemic and economic oppression/exploitation of subordinate racialized/ethnic groups by dominant racialized/ethnic groups with or without the existence of colonial administrations. Five hundred years of European colonial expansion and domination formed an international refugee law is an area of immense political contestation because "implicit in any grant of asylum is a censure of the country of origin of the refugee." 60 He notes the slippage that is apparent in the process of granting asylum, from offering a 'place of refuge' to advancing values that are, in the tradition of human rights, steeped in the language of 'culture', and as a function of nation-state thinking, reliant on a basic geopolitics of cultural or social morality.
The latter point, along with its allusion to a more profound critique of sovereignty (not addressed in this article) sets the backdrop for a more careful approach to viewing oppression and repression. First, those in political power should not be seen as representative of culture in such a way that allows nation to be conflated with culture, nor culture be conflated with violence. It is enough that culture is a word that is virtually impossible to define and depends on its context for meaning, certainly when it sits in conjunction with legal logics. 61 Madhavi Sunder suggests that, in certain legal contests, 'culture' is a system of power that produces content articulated by those in political power on behalf of the greater 'culture'. She uses various case examples from the US context to illustrate tension created within the structure of legal argument when one occupies the voice of cultural representative while being at the margins of power with respect to perceived cultural authenticity and representational legitimacy. 62 This tends to further marginalise those disenfranchised subsets of potentially already disenfranchised groups.
Balibar's 'death zones' concept, as well as Fanon's 'zones of being' and 'non-being', help us to reorient ourselves in relation to the assumptions of spaces of safety and violence with respect to refugee law in two ways. The concepts help us to reconfigure spatial violence into violence that follows particular people and subject positions from one place to another, which in turn draws our attention to shortcomings built into the refugee law system. Secondly, the concepts launch a more fundamental critique of refugee law in general, pointing to historical contingencies that call into question the moral basis for restrictions on free movement, particularly given the fact that refugee law is only available to a select and privileged few -those with the necessary material or political resources.
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division of labor between Europeans and non-Europeans that is reproduced in the present so-called 'postcolonial' phase of the capitalist world-system (Wallerstein 1979 (Wallerstein , 1995 
The Recurring Problem of 'Culture'
As the state-centred apparatuses of refugee law, international human rights and domestic constitutional reform are all contingent upon a rights framework of some sort, it is important to also critically assess the role of rights-based approaches in dealing with sex-, sexualityand gender-based violence. Until refugees are given official asylum status or other similar residency allowance, they do not have rights of citizens, and even then they may need to wait some years before acquiring full political rights. This negates the drawing of full rights and protections along national borders and supports Balibar's idea of the enmity line-there are people living in the same space under very different conditions. Extreme forms of violence are found within most states and are organised around relations of power, including race, gender, citizenship status, religion, and other separations between the 'zones of being and non-being.'
In a certain way, refugee law can be seen as bringing human rights imperialism full circle. The project of strengthening human rights standards through constitutional reform is concerned with a slightly but crucially different set of discursive practices than refugee protection. This difference compounds the paradox of rights. The logic of refugee protection is that the state is unable or unwilling to protect its citizen within its political borders, which sets into motion the narrative of saving the citizen-subject from her state of origin. This narrative locates human rights as existing within the receiving state, enabling and empowering logics of providing refuge to a defector at a cost. The refugee is often described as having escaped from a dangerous culture or condition into a better one. For many, this is the central function of refugee law, 64 regulated of course by strict political and economic interests in the receiving countries.
6566
The logic of global decriminalisation of same-sex sexual activity is, in general, seen as a struggle for equality on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. This struggle 64 Cf. Ibid., p. 201. Juss critically assesses the narrowness of refugee law by positing that refugee law today constitutes "an attempt by the international community to reconcile two irreconcilables: humanitarian need on the one hand and sovereign state control on the other." Such critique seeks to address a need greater than the scope permitted by the mechanisms of refugee law. A politics of recognising this mismatch is the difference between Juss's critique and conventional legitimations of the scope of refugee law and policy. 65 This includes for example persecution, which is a specific type of violence, that must be extreme, involve state action or unwillingness or inability to act, and be proven rigorously. is pitched mainly as one in favour of universal human rights, with the underlying logic that rights protection in countries outside of Europe will mean fewer refugees will need to cross borders to gain protection within Europe. This logic predominates despite the relatively small number of refugees that enters Europe each year, given the global migration of refugees.
However, the focus on inequality tends to take specific form and the type of equality that is prioritised is quite specific-both specific to the type of rights that should be afforded as well as the lesser prioritisation of other interests. This approach is marked by a familiar discourse within LGBTIQ activist groups, one that suggests that countries can be envisioned to exist along a continuum of rights protections for LGBTIQ people, from criminal sanctions to marriage.
Critiques of this evolutionary continuum model, which posits LGBTIQ rights as a discrete issue by which one can assess the relative social sophistication of a given country, are numerous. One significant critique is that it is at best disingenuous and likely impossible Another key difference in approach from local actors when confronted with a global agenda for a particular type of right for sexual and gender minorities is that some local movements are rooted in a different understanding of sexuality and gender norms, and actors within those movements may find it difficult to articulate the local politics of sexuality through the framework of 'LGBTIQ rights' as such. 68 The types of dissent from within different cultural systems are differently contingent-they are set at differing angles with respect to the political and cultural representations made by those in positions of power and influence, not necessarily concordant with the type of disagreement that activists and advocates might themselves describe from outside of the specific context. This relates to the different local sexual and gender politics, and attempting to alter the relative position of those in a given local setting by pressing hard for universal human rights irrespective of the complex entanglement of sexuality with other issues is potentially to enact more violence upon not only sexual minorities, but all of those in the 'zones of non-being.'
The Spectre of Colonialism
At both academic and activist conferences on LGBTIQ refugees, country conditions are inevitably discussed, and while in the courtroom there is no space for a discussion about local for the proposition of pre-colonial societies being sexual utopias. While these laws developed in locally-specific ways out of a common set of principles connected to colonial practices, to change the framing of 'exportation of homophobia' to more of a synthesis of a common legal framework across over forty countries over a few centuries is surely more concrete and more accurate. This does not suggest that one should envision the pre-colonial condition free from sexual and gender oppression, but it acknowledges that we continue today to grapple with the mechanisms of colonial laws, and this fact tends to complicate the discussion around specific forms of oppression faced by those in colonial societies.
Conclusion: The Refugee Project Reconsidered
So what does a queer or decolonial analysis have to do with refugee claims? Perhaps these lenses have less to do with individual refugee claims and more to do with rethinking refugee law generally, and with it, freedom of movement, conceptions of extreme violence, and We must also note that the reification of states as containers for violence and corresponding rights allows a bio-geo-political worldview to be instrumentalised to the and whether it should be radically rethought over the long term.
If we rely on human rights protections and the current refugee law regime, we could choose to do so in a way that at the very least acknowledges the death zones that Balibar refers to in describing violence against non-European citizens in Europe. This could potentially be done by granting full citizenship protections to those who are in the process of applying for refugee status. In the scheme of what I have discussed in this article, this is a cosmetic fix, but it does some work towards alleviating some of the state violence committed against refugees once they have landed in Europe. For example, having the right to work, full freedom of movement within the receiving state, and easy access to basic legal and medical services would be important to any person potentially fleeing persecution. In the case of
LGBTIQ people, very careful treatment of the credibility assessment around the applicant's narrative of sexuality is essential and critical thinking about not only sexuality, but intersectional identity, global geopolitical power relations, and the history of colonialism should be considered. While taking one at her word may not be the most politically viable suggestion for a test of credibility, one must certainly avoid the types of exclusionary practices that some
LGBTIQs have reported to have encountered, from intimidating or insensitive border guards, the lack of privacy when stating their reasons for seeking asylum, and judges who are incredulous of their claims because they either have children or had been in heterosexual relationships. That said, taking claimants' stories at their word would perhaps be considered more transformative, perhaps even queer, in refusing to re-inscribe systems of power that stagnate other forms of systemic violence and colonial relations.
When 'the right to live freely and openly' relies on credibility determination, and the credibility determination is a factor of the claim that is thought to go to the integrity of the individual who is applying for refugee status, is there an obligation on the part of recipient states to be profoundly deferential regarding credibility to those claiming persecution? In the case of LGBTIQs, does it mean that states should not require corroborating evidence for the establishment of gay identity? Or, from a different angle, does the British role in disseminating criminal laws in any way help to tip the balance in favour of viewing these laws as persecutory per se? 78 From within the comfort zone of legal rules and the traditional development of policy implementing those rules, it would be impossible and perhaps taboo to acknowledge the link on an individual basis. But should there nonetheless be a general policy of viewing these leftover laws as persecutory, given the recent history of empire and the continued existence of the Commonwealth? Could queering refugee law be one way to help us rethink migration or, at least, help externalize the costs of colonialism?
